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Fir1a'1:ial t-42.rkets:

A View from the 0er-.i-Periph~ryi'

Edrnar Lisboa Ba.cha
and

Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
(Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro and Yale University)
Private international financial intermediation has witnessed
successive cycles for the last 160 years.

In this century, it blosscmed

before the First World War and through the 1920s.

In the 1930s and

1940s, private capital markets went into an eclipse, to reappear
t1midly in. the 1950s, beaning in the 1960s and 1970s. Theorizing
about financial markets has on the whole followed those cycles.

Few

are the examples of powerful propositions emerging f'ran general
financial theories which are independent of historically-specific
institutional arrangements.
'Ibis pa.per discusses the interplay of financial aspects of
the history of world capitalism with theorizing about financial markets,
carried out rna.1nly in Northern countries.

It is organized as follows.

Three epochs in financial arrangement and theories are first briefly
reviewed, giving special emphasis to their impact on peripheral countries.

They are the pre-1929 years, 1944-1973 and 1973-1980. A long section
on the 1970s stylized facts follows.

Then some systemic issues of international

financial arrangements for the 1980s are discussed.

Finally, sane

aspects of the impact of international financial markets on I.atin America
are noted, and analytical problems suggested by unexpected consequences of recent attempts at financial reform in I.atin America are
debated.
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Frequent references will be made to orthodoxy.

'Ihis term is

not easy to define; it may be helpful to separate "academic" fran
"practical orthcxioxy

11

•

The fonner is the product of leading academic

centers of the tirre; it te~ds to be flexible and agnostic.

Its

leading thinkers often are its own major critics, frequently curious
about heterodox notions.

Practical orthodoxy is roore assertive.

It

is found in the editorials of the business press, among private or
public executives with .Masters' degrees, and among sane of the roore
politically or rinancially ambitious academics. The latter scxnet1mes
play a double role:

in their Northern universities, disciplined by

their colleagues, they are cautious scientists; during their surrrner
tours or the periphery, their libido 1.JTperante unleashed, they becane
fountainheads of practical orthodoxy.
It is practical orthodoxy that puts the system to work and
typically sets the Northern tone in North-South debates.

As such it

will be the ma.in focus of our analysis.
I-The Pax Britannica
The pre-1929 international financial order enjoyed a degree of
intellectual hegemony which has never been regained. The gold-exchange
standard was regarded as the natural regulator of the balance of payments.
Current account deficits and increases in international reserves were
financed using bonds with long maturities and fixed interest rates as
well as via direct investments.

Under the long Pax Britannica sane

countries (Germany, the USA) graduated from the role of capital importers
to that of capital exporters. At least until the 1920s, London ruled
the waves and regulated the whole system,!/ whose occasional cri~es
were regarded as passing aberrations or a necessary purging of
"excesses".

-3National fina~cial systems showed greater heterogeneity.

In

the United States populist pressures blocked the creation of a central
bank

until early this centl:ll"Y.

France and Germany developed financial

systems nnre centralized and state-dominated than that of the United
Kingdom, as analyzed by Alexander Gershenkron.

Apparently, British

hegemony in international relations of all types explains the greater
hanogeneity of the international financial rules of the game, in
contrast with those applicable nationally.
African and Asian colonies had little choice 1n their
financial systems, and tended to follow prevailing orthodoxy.

Several

1.ndeperxient Latin American countries, however, had difficulties
adhering faithfully to the gold-exchange standard.Y Mexico followed
a silver stan:iard for
gold.

many

years, while s11ver depreciated vis-a-vis

Argentina and Brazil often resorted to an "inconvertible

paper standard", frequently acccxnpanied by fiscal deficits and inflation
(the U.S. went through a similar period after its Civil War).
These Latin American experiments with flexible exchange rates
were viewed with fascinated disgust by orthodox scholars and bankers.
'lhe recurrent need for foreign finance as well as danestic political

pressures to keep debt service from taking too much of a share of the
budget would sporadically dictate a return to the gold-exchange standard
and

greater controls over danestic credit expansion. Foreign missions

played important roles in attempted returns to orthodoxy.

F.xarrples

include the Montagu Mission to Brazil in 1924 and those of Professor Edwin
Kerrmerer to several Andean countries.11 At least in the case of the
Brazilian return to the gold-exchange standard in the 1920s, the
economic results are regarded as negative.

During the 1920s the

League of Nations also participa ted in missions associate d with
Stabiliza tion Plans 1n countries such as Austria

4/
and

Hungary.-

The condition ality attached to internatio nal lending before
1929 included not only that linked to the natural desire of bankers
to be punctuall y paid at least the interest due on loans.

Political

considera tions also played a role in regulatin g access to capital
markets. French and German lending were heavily influence d by
political factors, as illustrate d by the fonner's loans to Czarist
Russia and the latter's loans to the Middle Fast •.2.1 Brazilian access
to the New York market was blocked by Herbert Hoover, -then Secretary of

Carmerce, in retaliatio n for the Brazilian coffee valorizat ion scheme;
Brazilian access to the London market 1n the late 1920s was also discreetl y
vetoed by the Foreign Office 1n retaliatio n for the Brazilian withdrawal
from the League of Nations. 61
The condition ality 1mposed before 1929 on the weakest periphera l

countries included foreign control over their tariff revenues and other
aspects of their fiscal and monetary machinery; this was the case of sane
Caribbean and Central American nations, in a fashion s1m1lar to that of
Zaire during the 1970s.
The great depressio n of the 1930s destroyed the gold-exchange
standard and internati onal capital markets as they existed before 1929.
The prestige of high finance collapsed ; in the USA financier s were the
target of New Deal attacks, and new legislatio n limited the flexibili ty of
national and internati onal financial intennedi aries.

European nazi-fasc ism

populariz ed exchange and financial controls going beyond those practiced
in other industria lized countries .

Several industria l countries declared

nnratoria on danestic debts and witnessed drastic restructu ring of
their financial systems.

-5Peripheric countries with certain political autonany, such
as Argentina, Brazil and Colanbia, reacted to the Great Depression
with a fairly rapid abandonment of gold standard orthodoxy, wisely
avoiding classical remedies.

Thus, Brazil was advised by a mission

headed by Sir Otto Niemeyer, of the Bank of England, to return to
7/

a fixed exchange rate and to maintain convertibility, on July 1931!These large or active Latin American countries allowed substantial
depreciations of their exchange rate, imposed

exchange

maintained a reasonable degree of danestic liquidity.

controls and
Nonnal debt

servicing was suspended 1n mst cases, just as U.S. fanners suspended

payments on their rnortgages.

Partly due to the closing of international

markets, Latin American countries showed greater interest in rnobilizing
dorrestic resources via the tax system and the creation of new gove:rnnent
controlled credit institutions.
countries during the 1930s

was

The

econanic perfonnance of these

remarkably good, better than that of

major industrialized countries.
II. The Pax Americana
The international financial order which emerged from Bretton
Woods in 1944, lasting until 1973, initially reflected the 1930s
disenchantment with laissez faire in financial transactions and was
influenced by Fabian/New Deal notions then daninant in the United
Kingdom and the United States.

The then United States Secretary of

the Treasury, Mr. Henry Morgenthau, regarded Bretton Woods as the
achievement of his lifetime ambition to '-'drive ••the usurious moneylenders
from the temple of international finance."~

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was born accepting changes
in exchange rates to correct "fundamental disequilibrium" and allowing
controls over capital movements.

The International Ba.nk for Reconstruction

-6and Development (IBPO) reflected pess:1m1sm regarding the viability of
private financial intermediation in the postwar world.

In the USA,

the official EXIMBANJ<, created in the 1930s originally to finance
trade with the USSR, was to play an important role in financing
US exports of capital goods, and was a critical institution in US
Latin American econanic relations.

Already in the 1950s and even

more so in the-1960s, the original Fabian/New Deal flavor of the
Bretton Woods institutions was diluted, but they continued to renect
certain theoretical and practical eclecticism absent in the pre-1929
international financial order.
At least during the late 1940s and 1950s, both national and
international financial intennediation received low priority. The
ultra-Keynesian notion that ''money does not matter" could easily be
extended. to "financial intermediation does not matter".

It was not

until the late 1950s that Europe abandoned. rigorous exchange controls
(the United. K:1ngdcxn maintained them until 1979) •
F.a.rly in the postwar, a new practical orthodoxy appeared
regarding capital iooverrents.

It became coomon to hear advice~

at peripheral countries regarding the inportance of

ma.inta.ining

a

favorable climate for direct foreign investments fran the North.

Before

1929, especially before the First World War, portfolio investments had
dominated those of a direct nature, and a good investment cl1rnate involved
mainly the punctual servicing of the debt.

Direct foreign invesbrent,

suppliers' credits plus official development assistance of various
sorts made up the bulk of capital inflows into the periphery well into
the 1960s.

All of these forms of finance implied a canplex and fairly

intimate relationship between lenders and borrowers.

-7Acade7~C orthod0xy had surprisingly little to say about the
benefits and costs of the postwar structure of capital flows between
North and South.

Tnere was a tendency to add up all forms of capital

flows into one aggregate necessary to finance the "foreign exchange
gap".

A comron attitude was that the greater this aggregate flow, the

better all around.

This academic complacency was first punctured by

peripheral (and Australian, Canadian, and European) criticism of
sane of the consequences of direct foreign investment and of multi
national corporations.

Sane aspects of official develoµnent assistance

also came under closer scrutiny, leading to more sophisticated
evaluations of the grant element involved in such flows.
As noted earlier, &I.ready in the 1950s the IMF and the IBRD
began to depart fran the vision of at least sane of their founding
fathers, especially that of John Maynard Keynes. The IBRD stuck to the
financing of specific projects, avoiding program lending.

'Ihe IBRD

also refused to lend to oil state enterprises, arguing that there were
plenty of private oil corporations willing to invest.

The IMF staff

increasingly favored rigid exchange rates buttressed by rigorous credit
policies, in a pattern similar to the pre-1929 rules of the game.

In

its dealings with peripheral countries given to heterodoxy, such as
several Latin American countries, the IMF missions revived the spirit of
Montagu and Niemeyer, advocating stiff stabilization plans.

It could

be argued that at least during the 1950s the leverage of the IMF missions
was not snaller than those of M:>ntagu and Niemeyer, as international

credit sources in the 1950s were few, and tended to follow the leadership
of the IMF (and the US Treasury) • The consequences of the practical
orthodoxy of the IMF were not very different from those of the Montagu
mission.

-8As late as the 1960s, those advocating greater resource
transfers fran North to South would call for more official development
assistance under

va.,......ious

fonns.

Regional development banks were

created, adding new official financial intennediar ies.
relationship s were sought.

New aid

Hopes were also expressed for a new

spirit in direct foreign investment.
In the.meanwh ile, the great postwar econanic expansion

which culmina.ted 1n the early 1970s was creating new conditions eroding
the postwar practical orthodoxy.

Almost accidentall y, a truly inter

national capital market emerged around the m1d-1960s, 1n the fonn of
EurocUITency credits.
'!he

El.trodollar market, based on dollar deposits in banks

outside the United States, arose from the desire of derna.nders and
suppliers of those deposits to avoid actual or potential U.S. banking
regulations .

The Soviets were among the first depositors of dollars

in banks located 1n Europe; they feared that accounts opened in the

United States might be attached by U.S. citizens who had claims against
the USSR.

furing tight credit conditions in 1968 and 1969 U.S. com

mer•cial banks bid for dollars in the Eurodollar market by offering yields
above those pennitted 1n the U.S. by Regulation Q, which dates back
to 1933.

B:mks based in IJ::>ndon and other European financial centers

found that accepting dollar deposits and extending dollar loans was
profitable, with reserve requirement s dictated only by what each bank
deened prudent.

The tacit approval of Central B:mks was of course

necessary. The practice of accepting deposits in cUITencies other than
that used locally spread to sterling, Gennan marks, Swiss francs and
others; banks outside Europe also joined the market which now encooipasses
agents in Singapore, the Caribbean and elsewhere.

-9Growing macroeconardc disharmonies am::ing the indust rialize d
countr ies in the late 1960s, the US involvement in Vietnam, and
increas ed capita l J'OC>bility put enorm::>us pressur es on fixed paritie s.
These c1rc\El1Stances led to abandonment by the US of gold conve rtibilit y
in August 1971
1973.

and

to genera lized floatin g of key curren cies in early

This Annus Mirabi lis culminated with the sharp rise in oil

prices , putting an·end of the postwa r era of cheap energy .
III. Pax Arabica?
The period 1973-1980 has been highly unusual in the history

of interna tional finance .

A new type of capita l export er has emerged,

which has no histori cal preced ent.

Consider the followi ng contra st

between OPEC capita l ·export ers and those of earlie r eras:
a) The militar y power of major OPEC countr ies is trivia l,
certain ly insuffi cient to enforce financ ial contra cts agains t recalc itrant
debtor s. It has been noted that every lender ultima tely needs bailiff s
at his back;W OPEC does not have them.
b) OPEC countr ies lack capita l goods indust ries, or indeed an
extens ive indust rial base, to achieve the real transfe r ultima tely
desired by foreign -excha nge-co nstrain ed capita l inport ers.
techno logical base is weak.

OPEC's

It is difficu lt to imagine the equiva lent

to British exports of railway equipment or US direct foreign investment
for the OPEC case. Oil is a nonrenewable asset for OPEC, but a curren t
input for inporte rs.
c) OPEC capita l export ers had during 1973-80 only limited
financ ial institu tions of their own; they have relied heavily on
financ ial interm ediarie s of indust rialize d countr ies.
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d)

OPEC

national cu..TTencies are used only marginally as

reserve or vehicle currencies; the influence of OPEC over international
monetary arrangements is growing, but is still modest.
e) The
resource.

rnaj or

component of OPEC wealth is a nonrenewable

If investment in financial or real assets yield low rates

of return, OPEC countries could adjust by decreasing their
oil output, 1.e. , by investing in oil under ground. 'Ihus, part of
OPEC's "home investment" could decrease the world's aggregate supply
in the short and medium term.
These considerations imply a

good

deal of interdependence

between the old and the new capital exporters, involving both econanic
and political aspects.

The latter have becane highly visible since

1973 in contrast with previous years, when they were discreetly hidden.
The network of trade flows has also becane more canplex and multilateral,

involving greater triangu.larity among old and new capital exporters
and

the Third World.
The Eurocurrency market and international banking, already

vigorous before 1973, have turned out to be (on the whole) flexible
and efficacious instruments to accoom:xiate the new capital exporters and

the major semi-industrialized capital importers.

A closer look at the

Eurocurrency market and its links with the OPEC surplus is WarTanted.
Many

transactions in Eurocurrency markets are between banks,

and produce a limited amountof maturity transformation.

International

corporations also engage in considerable borrowing and lending in those
markets.

Depending on circumstances, economic agents switch fran OECD

national financial markets to the Eurocurrency market, and vice-versa.
Using an old analogy, illustrated in Figure 1, Eurocurrency markets,

-11-
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international banking and OECD financial markets more generally may
be viewed as a giant bathtub within which much churning (gross
financial intermediation) takes place, and where ripples in one
sef2fl}ent are quickly transmitted to other se~nts.
Net inflows into and net outflows out of this bathtub can
be defined in a number of ways, depending on one's analytical focus,
including desired level of aggregation.

In this paper we will be

interested mainly in the role of financial markets as providers of
Ba.lance of Payments net financing to large groups of LDCs, as well as
their role as receivers of net inflows from OPEC.
It should be clear that Eurocurrency markets have a life and
a financial role which are independent of OPEC surpluses, just as their
coming into being was not caused by U.S. balance of payments deficits
of the 1960s. 'Ihe gross stock of assets and liabilities of these
markets is only marginally influenced by the net flows generated in
a given year by the Ba.lance of Payments of different countries.

Even

if all countries were to be in Balance of Payments equilibrit.m1 from
now on, one could expect Eurocurrency markets to continue to grow
as financial intermediary among the various agents participating in
international trade and finance.

-13While the performance of international banks as financial in-:ten-;}2diaries during 1973-80 was remarkably good, present arrangements
remain historically anoma.lous and vulnerable in several ways.
Besides the contrasts already noted between new and old capital
exporters, consider the following points:
a) The level of OPEC capital exports depends heavily on the
real price of oil, rather than on stable long-term saving and investment
propensities.

I:Xlring

1974 through 1977 OPF.C surpluses were large,

but tending tDdecrease until 1978, when they practically disappeared;
in 1979 they rose sharply once again.

For sane importers of both oil

and capital it is unclear whether the inflows are adding to productive

capacity or simply maintaining consumption above levels sustainable
in the long run (assuming the persistence of high real energy prices).
Contrary to much historical experience in the periphery, worsening
tenns of trade accompany the capital inflow.
b) The 1973-80 recycling was aided by "rroney mirage" in the
part of capital exporters.

Ex-post real yields on dollar--0enorninated

financial assets were low, certainly lower than the yield of oil in
the ground.

One wonders how long such a nnney mirage can last.

Yet

insistence by capital exporters on "normal" positive real rates of
return on their financial assets would add to the problems of capital
1mporters.
c) Political relations between old and new capital exporters
are far from harroonious.

Tensions between Iran and the USA, leading

to the freeze in 1979 of Iranian assets 1n US-owned banks, had important
negative repercussions in the syndicated Eurocurrency market.
scenarios are much too easily imagined.

catastrophic

-14Tne historical anOl;'ialies raised

by

the emerp;ence o~ O?EC as

the major capital exporter deserve closer empirical scrutiny. The
next section presents structural features of international financial
nows and stocks since 1973, emphasizing those of special interest

to the Periphery.

N. The 1970s: stylized facts and trends
'Ihl.s section is organized as follows.

Global balance of

payments patterns are reviewed first, en;>hasizing.LDC and Latin American
deficits.

Recent LDC financing arrangements are discussed and con;:,ared

with earlier postwar experience. The analysis of financial

nows

leads to a consideration of debt magnitudes and of the burden of debt
servicing, which are placed 1n historical perspective.
of international private banking follows.

A discussion

The section closes with a

carparative look at official and other lenders.

A. Global patterns
The

global pattern of current account deficits and surpluses

since 1973 are surrmarized in Table 1, and are expressed in dollars of
constant value.

It may be seen that net capital flows fluctuated con

siderably fran year to year; the OPEC surplus was only $4 billion in
1978 but is expected to reach $71 billion (at 1975 prices) in 1980.
The average pattern for 1974-80 is likely to continue well into the
1980s.

Indeed, with the indexing of oil prices and roore prudent ;md

steadier OPEC development plans, the indicated pattern could be more
stable during the 1980s than it was in the 1970s, when the real OPEC
surplus declined sharply between 1974 and 1978.

Both the OPEC surplus

and the LDC deficit can be called structural in the sense that neither could
be eliminated within a reasonabie t:1me span just by changes in exchange
rates and macroeconomic policies.

-15TABLE 1
Global Patterns of Current Accounts
•·

(In Billion U.S. dollars at 1975 prices)

Industrial
Countries

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

Average
1974-80

OPEC

Non-oil
LOCs

(Of which
Socialist
Western
countries and
Hemisphere) errors and
omissions

25
-15
16
-2
-5
25
-8
-32

9
76
35
40
29
4
48
71

-16
-42
-46
-32
-26
-29
-39
-42

(-8)

-19
-20
-5
-6
1

(-10)
(-13)
(-13)

-2
3

-3

43

-36

(-13)

-4

(-7)
(-15)
(-17)
(""."12)

Source : Adapted fran Table 11, Appendix C, p. 95, in World Economic outlook;
A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
May 1980. Data in current dollars were deflated by the dollar unit value indices
for industrial countries exports, as published in International Monetary Fi.md,
International Financial Statistics. Data for 1980 are rough estimates.
Negative signs imply deficits 1n current account.

-16Non-oil LOCs ca"1 be expected to be net capital ir.lporters,
but it is important to exarrJ.ne how the deficits were financed and
whether the inflow was accompanied by the maintenance of domestic
savings efforts.

Given dollar inflation and economic growth, it is

also of interest to establish the magnitude of financing needs relative
to other macroeconomic magnitudes.
The current account deficits of non-oil Latin American countries
are presented in Table 2 as a percentage of exports and ~oods and services
since 1950.

These deficits resulted from short term fluctuations as well

as from the interaction of demand and supply for long term capital.

One

may conjecture that the deficits for 1960-62 (the heyday of the Alliance
for Progress) and 1970-73, in the order of 22 percent of exports,
represent reasonable approximations to desired long run capital inflows.
The low numbers for the 1950s reflect poor supply conditions in world
capital markets, while the extraordinary deficits for 1974-76 indicate
special circumstances unlikely to be sustair)able over the long run.
By 1977-78 the deficit was around 1967-73 levels, but rose again 1n
1979.
Two remarks may be ma.de about the relative magnitudes of preand post-1973 Latin American deficits, with conflicting implications regarding
the sustainability of 1977-79 deficits.

The

GNP growth rate acccmpanying

post-1973 deficits was lower than that for 1967-73; the fonner was
roughly 5 percent per annum 1n contrast with 7 percent for the earlier
years.
World inflation, however, is leading to an overestimation
of the magnitudes of external savings.
;

Under present institutional

arrangements the allocation of debt service between interest and

-17TABLE 2

Current Accou.'1t Deficit of Latin America, excluding oil exporters,
relative to exports of goods and services.

(Percentages)
1950-54
1955-59
1960-62
1963-66
1967-69
1970-73
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

8
13
22
9
16
22
44
52
30

18
20
27

Sources: Computed from data presented in Cuademos Estcrlisticos de la
Cepal, El Balance de Pagos de America Latina 1960-1977, Naciones Unidas,
Santiago de Chile 1979, Table 4, and fran revised and updated data
kindly rre.de available by An<:lrfbs Bianchi, of the Cepal staff. The table
includes 16 countries; Cuba, the newly-independent Caribbean nations,
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are excluded.

-18a~o:'tization is distorted in favor of the former by dollar inflation,
thus increasing the magnitude of cUITent account deficits.
exa'Tlple clarifies this question.

A numerical

Suppose that net debt at the end of the

previous year is $1,000, and that nom1nal amortization remittances this year
are zero arid the nominal rate of interest is 15 percent per anmrn.
D::>llar inflation, affecting the debtor country export and import prices,
is 10 percent per annum.

Consequently, the real value of net debt at

end of this year is $900.

Of the $150 interest paid out, $50 is real

interest and $100 is real debt amortization.

Ordinary balance of

payments accounting registers a $150 outflow in cUITent account and
a zero outflow in capital account.

Inflation-proof accounting should

register $50 in service payments and $100 in debt amortization, the
latter being a capital account item.

Real domestic savings is $100

higher and real foreign savings $100 lower than indicated by current
accounting procedures.

In the case of Brazil, for example, it has

been estimated that using inflation-proof accounting method&,the current
account deficit for 1978, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is 2.1
percent instead of the 3.1 percent given by uncorrected data.

For 1979,
the contrast is even stronger: 2.2 percent versus 4.0 percent. 101

Given an investment rate, est:1.ma.tes for domestic saVings would have to
be adjusted upwards by corresponding percentage points.
In the Brazilian study just mentioned, innation in the

United States was used to deflate debt figures.
have been proposed:

other debt denators

dollar export prices of the country in question,

ternlS of trade, and the consumer expenditure denator (adjusted for
exchange rate changes). ll/ nenating by tern1S of trade is plainly

wrong; the use of the consumer expenditure deflater is likely to
into practical difficulties.

The

run

theory of shadow exchange rates and

-19pra~tical considerations strongly sugrest a deflator which is a weig.~ted
sur:-; of dollar export and import prices, with the weights reflectin's the
JllaI'f,.i.'1al

sha..~s of exports and imports in the adjustment process.

B. LOC Fina'1cine a.."Ta"1f';ements
Net financing needs during the 1970s have gone beyond those
indicated by current account deficits; dollar inflation, real trade
growth and a more uncertain international environment have led to an
increase in the demand for reserves.

Few LDCs could rely on perfectly

flexible exchange rates to do away with reserves.

Thus, Table 3 includes

·net reserve accumulation together with current account deficits to
obta1n net financial needs of all non-oil LDCs, expressed at current
dollar prices.

As measured by traditional indicators, the reserve

accumulation shown in Table 3 does not appear excessive.

For all

non-oil LDCs gross reserves amounted to 28 percent of imports of goods
and services dur:1ng 1967-72; this ratio moved down to 21 percent during
1974-76, recovering to 25 percent during 1977-79 (data source as in
Table 3).

The corresponding figures for non-oil Western Hemisphere

LOCs give a sanewhat different picture:

22 percent for 1967-72,

22 percent for 1974-76 and a jtm1p to 33 percent during 1977-79. This
bulge, however, is being reduced during 1980.

Many

IDCs contracted debt

when conditions were favorable during the 1970s, letting reserves as
well as undisbursed debt nuctuate.
Table 3 shows that two traditional sources of finance, grants
and direct foreign investment, reduced their relative contribution
after 1973.

Net long term borrowing fran official sources such as

the World and regional banks, and from private financial institutions,
ma.:1nly banks, make up the bulk of the expansion of external finance.

Bond issues and suppliers' credits fran non-official sources remain
relatively small contributors of net finance.

-20TABLE 3

Fina'1cial Sources for all Non-oil LDCs

(A'1!1ual averwes in current billion dollars)

Current account deficit
Net reserve accumulation

Net transfers received by governments
Net direct investment
Net long-term borrowing:
-from official sources
-from f1nancial institution s
-from bond issues,net
-from suppliers' credits
-other
Net short-term borrowing,o ther·
net, and errors and omissions:

1973
11.3
9.7
21.0
lj. 5

1974-75-76
38.3
4.3
42.6

1977-78
32.1
15.0
47.1

ll. 3

6.8
5.1

5.5

10.ll

ll.o

9.1

0.5
1.5

0.5
0.9
3.3

-3.ll

0.3

6.5

-0.8

o. ll

1979-80
61.5
10.0
71.5

7.7

10.ll

5.8

7.7

15.3
17.5
3.1
1.9

17.5
16.8

{

Sources: Adapted from Table 19, p.101, in World Econoorl.c Outlook; A Survev by
the Staff of the Internation al Monetary Fund, May 1980, Washington, D.C. IAita
for 1979-80 involve rough estimates as well as projections . Data on gross
reserves relative to imports of goods and services are given in pp.lllarid 9ll

9.8

9,3
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These trends are sharper for Latin Ame:-ica, as may be seen
in Table 4.

Grants have been a very minor part of external finance since

the early 1960s; other fonns of public resources have also undergone
a decline 1n importance during the 1970s.

Private djrect investment,

which provided nearly one-third of all long-tenn external
resources during the 1960s, by 1977-78 accounted for little more than
one-sixth.

Prlvate banks and other private financial institutions have

become the major suppliers of external finance.
C. Debt accumulation and servicing
The sunmation of net yearly borrowing nows yields the increase

in non-OPEC Third World debt.

Thus, according to Table 3, long-tenn

debt to all official and private creditors nust have increased by about
$141 billion between the end of 1973 and the end of 1978. The surrmation
of net direct investment flows yields the increment in foreign equity
in the capital stock located within non-oil LOCs, ignoring capital gains
and losses; such equity has no predetennined repayment schedule, as debt
has under present institutional arrangements, although it generates outflows
of profit remittances, as debt generates interest paymen~s.
Reported debt figures contain great variety; they .are often
presented in a manner intE:ni' ?d more to shock than to enlighten.

One

source of discrepancy aroong estimates is whether short-tenn (less than
one year) debt is or is not included.

At any one point there is a large

float of short-tenn credits to finance LOC imports; such stock grows
with the increase of trade values, but it can be expected to provide
little help to financing current account deficits over the long I'U!1·
Short tenn policy headaches

may

arise if nonnal corrrnercial credits are

suddenly curtailed, but this is not what most observers have in mind
when discussing the "debt problem".

Another way in which debt figures can

-22TABIE 4
Net

wng

Tenn Inflow of Exter nal Resources for Latin America
(Annual averages 1n curre nt billio n dolla rs)

1961-65

1966-70

1971-73

1974-76

1977-78

Net Eubli c inflow

1.0

1.1

1.4

2.8

1.7

Mult ilater al
Bilat eral

0.3
0.6

o.4
0.6

o.8
0.6

1.6
1.2

0.9
o.8

Net priva te inflow

0.6

1.6

3.9

9.6

17.0

Supp liers
Finan cial.i nstitu tions
Bonds
Direc t investment

0;1

0.2

0.1
o.4

o.4
0.3
0.1
0.9

2.0
0.1
1.6

0.3
6.7
0.3
2.4

1.6
9.9
2.3
3.2

Total

1.6

2.6

5.3

12.4

18.8

Sourc es: Adapted from Table III-1 3, p.85, in Inter-American Devel
opment Bank,
Economic and Socia l Progr ess in Latin America; 1979 Reoo rt,
Washinp;ton, D. C.
"Lati n America" inclu des the Inter-American Bank's devel oping
member count ries
in the Western Hemisphere.

-23be inflated iz the inclusion of undisburse-d portions of contracted
loans.
A

second maj oY' sou...Y>Ce of difference in reported debt figures
..

is whether or not items other tha~ those owed by official
or which are officially guaranteed, are included.

LDC

borrowers,

Published World Bank

data, for example, only cover official and officially guaranteed debt.
Most meditm1 and long-term credits to the Third World would fall under
this category, but some countries (e.g. Argentina) have large private
debts not guaranteed by the government.

The stmrnation of balance of

payments data should give net increases in debt, whether or not officially
guaranteed.
A third difference comes about from definitions of "net".

Suppose

for example, that all acctmrulated long term borrowing from f~cial
institutions shown in Table 3 for 1974-78 ($62.3 billion) came fran banks
which also held the accumulated increase of LOC reserves ( $42. 9 billion) •
Reported net debt to those banks could then be said to have increased
only by $19.4 billion.

Data on private bank positions vis-a-vis LOCs

are frequently 11 netted" in this fashion.
Other differences may arise from geographical or other coverages.
There has been a proliferation of ways of grouping Third World countries,
even within old geographical units.

The IMF has a category of "net

oil exporters" within the group of "non--011 developing countries", and
non--0il Western Hemisphere developing countries is not quite the same
as what used to be meant by Iatin America.

Behind these confusions lie

the growing heterogeneity of the Third Wor],.d.

Aggregation, especially

in the area of debt, has only a limited usefulness and can yield mislead~
or meaningless numbers.

-24Tne

total outsta~ding public and publicly guara~teed long term

external debt of all non-oil developing countries rose from $76 billion
at the end of 1973 to $212 billion at the end of 1978, an increase
in line with the data of Table 3.

The IMF, in the publication cited

1n that Table, also estimates a debt of $280 billion for the end of

1980.

'Ihe corresponding figures for non-oil Western Hemisphere

developing coU17,tries are $26 billion for 1973, $83 billion for 1978,
and $104 billion for 1980.

It is est1mated that about half of the

debt of all non-oil :r..ocs is owed to private creditors; for the debt
of non-oil Western Hemisphere developing countries the corresponding
figure is higher, sanewhat less than two-thirds.
Debt has grown, but so have price levels, exports, and
production.

Table 5 expresses the stock of deb.t as a percentage of

LOC output and exports.

Viewed in this light, the growth of LOC

debt appears significant but less terrifying.

For all non-oil LOCs

debt has risen relative to Gross Domestic Product between 1973-74 and
1979-80; relative to exports of goods and services it rose between
1973-74 and 1977-78, and declined after that.

Latin American in

debtedness is above the average for the Third World, and on the whole
rose faster during the 1970s.

The last column of Table 5 shows debt

relative to merchandise e~ports for non-oil Western Hemisphere
developing countries; it indicates a sharp rise between 1974 and 1978,
but a steep decline after that year.

In short, Table 5 serves to

emphasize the obvious (but often forgotten) point that so long as
output and exports continue to expand pari oassu with debt, the
servicing of the latter should not ge,nerate rna,jor anxieties.

It may

be noted that around 1910 the Argentine public external debt aroounted
to 184 percent of its merchandise exports, a figure higher than any

-25TABLE 5
Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt

1960
1970
1973
1974
1975·
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

As a Percentage of Gross Product

As a Percentage of Exports
of Goods and Services

All nonoil LOCs

All nonoil LDCs

n.a.
n.a.
14
13
15
16
18
19
19
19

Ma,_ior LOC
exporters of
manufactures
n.a.
n.a.
11
10
12
12
13
14
13
lll

All
Latin
America
11
14
17

18
19
23
25
28
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
70
64
76
78

82
86
80
7l!

Major LOC
exporters of
manufactures
n.a.
n.a.
61

55
62
61
61
63
57
53

n.a. = Means data are not available.
Sources: Data for 1973 thro~..h 1980 comes from Table 23, Appendix C, p.103
in World Economic Outlook; A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary
Fund, Washington, D.C., May 1980. "Gross Productn refers to Gross Domestic
Product. Data for 1960 through 1978 comes from Table III-23., p.97, in
Inter-American Development Bank., Econanic and Social Progress in Latin America;
1979 Report, Washington, D.C. "Gross Product" refers to Gross National Product.
"Latin America" includes the Inter-American Bank's developing member countries
in the Western Hemisphere. The last column is canputed from data in the
World Economic Outlook, ~ cit, pp. 99 and 102

-26reGistered in the last column of Table 5. 121
Interest plus amortization payments are presented. in Table 6
as percentages of exports.

This measure of the debt burden will

increase as debt maturity shortens; if all debt were made up of consols,
only interest would be included in the servicing, but if all loans had
to be renewed yearly,annual service would cover the whole debt plus
interest.

The statistic for the debt service ratio will be interpreted

differently depending on what 1s assumed regarding the automaticity
of the roll-over process.

Table 6 shows a sharp increase in this

statistic for Latin American countries between 1974 and 1978; for other
LOCs the increase is smaller.
A longer and broader perspective on the burden to Latin America
of servicing all accumulated capital inflows is presented in Table 7.
Latin America came out of the 1930s and 1940s with little debt and sane
direct foreign investment.

Pre-1929 debts and foreign investment were

sharply reduced relative to GNP and exports by defaults, renegotiations, nation
eliZ<i.tions,infl ation and war-induced European liquidations. During 1950-51' profit
remittances by direct foreign investors exceeded debt service charges.
Since then the latter have expanded steadily, even as a fraction of
exports of goods and services.

Profit remittances also tended to grow

relative to exports until 1965-69; since then it has undergone a littlenoticed but 1mportant decline.

In 1974-76 profit remittances represented

a lower percentage of exports of goods and services than during 1950-51';
during 1977-79 that percentage rose again, but remained below 1970-73 levels.
As noted earlier, dollar inflation, under present institutional
~ements, increases interest payments relative to amortization in
the servicing of a given loan.

Inflation may also shorten the average
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Service Payments on Public and Publicly Guaranteed External
Debt as Percentages of Exports of Goc<ls and Services

All nonoil LOCs
1961-65
1966-70
1971-75
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

Maj or UX::

exporters
of manufactures

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
9
7
9
9
10
11
11

11

Principal Debtor Rest of
Countries in
Latin America
Latin America

n.a.
n.a.
n.• a.
8
7
8
7
8

15
16
15
15
12
16
18

9
9
8

30
n.a.
n.a.

22

5
6
7
8
7
6
7
7
15
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.=Means data are not available
Sources: Data for 1973 through 1980 comes from Table 25, Appendix C, p.104,
in World Economic Outlook, op cit.
Data in the last two columns comes frcm
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 9£. cit., Table III-26, p.101.
"Principal Debtor Countries" are Argen't1na, Brazil, Colornbia, Chile, Mexico,
Peru and Venezuela. Service payments include interest and amortization.
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7

Net Fina'1cic.l Service Charges of Latin America, Excluding Oil
Exporters, relative to Exports of Goods a11d Services
(Percentages)

Period

1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
1970-73
1974-76
1977-79
~

Interests

1.3
2.3
4.0
5.5
7.4
11.1

12.0

Profits

5.9
5.2
6.5
8.8
7.1
5.5
6.8

Interests plus
Profits

7.2
7.5
10.5
14.J
14.5
16.6
18.9

Amortizati9ns

2.8
7.2
10.9
13.7
17.2
19.1
28.1~-

refers to 1977-78 only.

Sources: As in Table 2. "Profits" include earnings of foreign direct
investments net of truces, whether remitted abroad or reinvested domestically
(see p.5 of the source listed in Table 2). Interests and profits received
by Latin American residents are netted from the payments made under these
rubrics. For example, interest earned by La.tin American Central Banks
on their holdings of international reserves are deducted fran interest
payments on the external debt. Amortizations cover those for both private
and public debt of more than one year; however, data on amortizations of
private debt not officially guaranteed are shaky for most countries.

-29maturity o:' all dett; that average maturity will also incre2.se as
a result of a greater share of borrowing from private sources.

Both

of these factors cari increase am::>rtizations relative to both e:xports
and interest payments.

Table 7 indicates a decline in amortizations

relative to interest payments from 1955-59 until 1974-76; in the
most recent years this trend was reversed.
The sum of interests and profits as a percentage of exports
shoi'm in Table 7 may be canpared to those of "countries of recent
settlement" before the Great Depression.

During 1900-14 the corres

ponding figures were 39 percent for Argentina, 22 percent for Australia
and 24 percent for Canada.

s1m1lar ratios:

I:uring

1921-29 these three countries had

19 percent for Argentina, 21 percent for Australia

and 19 percent for Canada.

All of these historical percentages

refer to interest and profits relative to merchandise exports (whose
statistics are more ccmparable).

For the countries shown in Table 7

merchandise exports were about 82 percent of exports of goods and
services.

Even after adjusting for this fact, the interest and profit

share in exports shown in Table 7 for 1977-79 is roughly comparable
to those of pre-1929 "countries of recent settlement. 11131
D. Private Banking
Private banks owned mainly by residents of industrialized
countries proved to be the most dynamic agents in international capital
markets during 1973-80.

Those banks may be located in the country

owning them, lending in their own currency, or they may be located offshore,
lending in other currencies.

The close interconnection among major national

and international financial centers makes the distinction of only limited
economic interest, although important for the implementation of possible
controls and for jurisdictional disputes. Most of the banks engaged in
international lending now report to the Bank for International Settlements

(BI~); by the end of 1978 their accumulated lendinr; a~d borrowing
operations were as surrrnarized 1n Table 8.

Claims include loans of all

maturities and to public and private agents.

Tne

importance of major

oil exporting countries (mainly OPEC) and other developing countries
for international banking is readily apparent.
BIS reports also show the concentration of bank lending to
a few countries.

Just Brazil and Mexico accounted for roore than one

third of the b~s' claims on non-oil LDCs at the end of 1978. other
important LDC borrowers include Liberia, South Korea, Peru, Argentina,
F.cuador and the Phillipines.

On the other hand, a large number of

LOCs, including among.them those with very low per capita incanes, are
net creditors of the international banks, i.e., their reserves deposited
with those banks exceed the loans received.
of other Asia and other Africa 1n Table 8.

Note the low net positions
International banking has

no m:>re regard for interregional or interpersonal equity than national
banking does.

'Ille credit provided by banks is ~tm1-tenn, that 1s,

or so.

7 years

Technically, credits are renewed every six roonths but the bank is

contnitted for the full seven years; no cases are known where the six
roonth "roll-over" has been denied (unless there has been a default).
Typically, interest is adjusted every six months; the borrower is
corrrnitted to pay the nuctuating London inter-bank offered rate (LIBOR~
plus a margin, the "spread", usually fixed for the full life of the loan.
Some credits provide for an increase in spreads during the latter years
of the loan to compensate for longer maturities and to allow for
inflation.
dollars.

Eurocredits to LDCs have been provided almost totally in
Besides LIBOR and spreads, the borrower pays management and

ccmnitment fees; some loan agreements also require borrowers to maintain
compensating balances with the lending banks, but this is said to
14/
be unusual.-

-31TABIE 8
International B9...'1ks Outsta~d.inp: Stock of Cla:1ms and Liabilities
(Billion current U.S. dollars)
December 1979
Claims
"Group of
Fourteen''
other
Industrialized
Countries
Offshore
Banking Centers
Ea.stem Europe
Oil-exporting
Countries
Non-oil LOCs
-Latin America
-Middle Fast
-other Asia
-other Africa
Unallocated
Total

Liabilities

Net Position
Net
Position

December

December

1978

1977

588

686

-98

-67

-59

73

47

26

26

27

156
56

139
15

16
41

27
37

27
30

64
159
(104)
(8)
(33)
(14)
16

120
90
(38)
(16)
(27)
(9)
23

-56
69
(65)
(-8)

-26
45
(47)
(-7)
(2)

-39
37
(41)
(-5)

1,111

1,120

(7)

(5)
-7
-10

(4)

-5

-6

36

18

Source: Adapted from Fiftieth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements,
Ba.sle, June 1980, p. 119. "Group of Fourteen" includes the better known Group of
Ten plus Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Ireland. other industrialized countries
includes Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and other countries 1n Western Europe.
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indicators of lending conditions at the Eurocurrency

market a.-ne presented in Table 9.

It

may

be seen that LIBOR, the spreads,

and the maturities nuctuate considerably fran year to year.

At any

one time the spreads can be quite different as between countries
among borrowers

or

the same country.

and

At mid-1977 the following spreads

were reported for sovereign borrowers: 151
Britain·, France, Iran, Sweden
Spain
Italy
Mexico
Philippines and South Korea
Brazil
Peru
Bunna.

0.875
1.250
1.375
1.625
1.750
2.250
2.250
2.500

The criteria used to establish these differences are not
transparent.

With the wisdan of hindsight one can spot anomalies:

note the contrast between the figures given for Iran and Peru, and that
between the rnid-1977 spreads for Mexico arid late 1980 reports that
PEMEX is borrowing at 0.25 above LIBOR, the lowest margin known to have
been granted on a syndicated loan. 161 Unpublished attempts to statistically
explain differences in spreads across countries suggest that they increase
with the ratio of debt to gross national product, and decline the higher
the per capita inccme of the borrower. 171 Besides country-specific
characteristics, spreads seem influenced by general conditions, including
such intangibles as "market confidence", as during 1974-75. 'lbese issues
require further detailed work.
Data on fees are nr::>re difficult to obtain than for spreads.
Management fees are usually a flat percentage of the loan, ranging fran 0.375
to 0.75 percent, paid only at the t:1me the credit a.rTangement is signed.
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9

Indicators of Lending Conditions at the Eurocurrency Market
(Percentage s except for maturities)

Spreads
Year

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

LIBOR
. 11.32
7.74
6.26
6.54
9.48
12.12

Maturities( ronths)

Prjj-oe

France

0.58
1.42
1.09
0.92
o.63
0.36

All LDCs Brazil

1.13
1.68
l.72
1.55
1.20
0.87

Borrowers

1.2#"
1.70
1.91
1.96
1.59
1.16?!

96
66
69
80
101
108

Brazil

11~
75
70
68
85
111£1

a/ refers to the last three quarters of the year only.
b/ refers to the first half of the year only.

Sources: First three coltm11s obtained from the World Banlc, World. Development
Report, 1980, Washington D.C., August 1980, p.27.

Brazilian data obtained

t'.ran Paulo Nogueira Baptista Jr., "D1v1da extema braslleira" , Conjuntura

Econctnica, April 1980, volmne 3Lt, number 4, pp. 86-92.

Data on "prime

borrowers" obtained from Kengo Inoue, "Determinants of market conditions in
the eurocurrenc y imrket;

why

a "borrowers" market?", BIS Working Papers,

Number 1, April 1980, Table 1. Spreads exclude fees.

-34Besides this "front-end" fee, borrowers usually are contnitted to pay
a facility fee at an annual rate on undrawn portions of a credit;
this may range between 0.25 and 0.75 percent.

It is said that sOOE

borrowers trade off higher.front-end fees for lower spreads, for the
sake of prestige.
Neither spreads nor fees, however, bear the full brunt of
rationing credJJ; banks prefer to discourage or limit sane potential
borrowers rather than charge them unusually high spreads or fees.

Credit

rationing can be explained even for danestic markets as a result of
asynmetric infonna.tion ~tween creditors and debtors.

If only interest

rates were used to allocate credit, those intending to default (expecting
to get around legal penalties) would borrow as nuch as possible
regardless of interest rates; this is the adverse selection market
inperfection. Banks try to protect themselves against dishonest borrowers
both by investigating all custaners and by limiting exposure to any one
of them.

In international lending adverse selection is canpotmded by

sovereign or country risk, because national bankruptcy laws and
penalties do not apply. 17bis/
Even with the addition of fees, the charges shown in Table 9
appear ex-post quite attractive for average~ borrowers, bearing 1n
mind that dollar unit values for non-oil~ exports rose during
1972-80 at an average annual rate of nearly 15 percent, while those

181 One should
for LOC imports rose at m:>re than 16 percent per annum.
note, however, that the price increases were highly irregular from
year to year, and across conmodities and countries.

Yet these ex-post

results compare quite favorably with interest charges of around 5 percent
on the Argentine external debt of 1900-1~, at a time when international

-35in:'latio:-: averar.:ej les::: than 2 percent per a'1.11um.

Tne ex-oost avera.p;e

bor70Kll1£; costs for 1973-80 also compa..-ne favorably with reasonable
estimates for the real return to investment in LOCs.
As

noted earlier, about two-thirds of non-oil Western Hern.isphere

developing countries is owed to private creditors, mainly banks, which
is subject to service charges and conditions similar to those described
in Table 9 and in previous paragraphs.

It is not surprisin.P; that in

those countries· fluctuations in LIBOR and spreads have joined variations
in the prices for oil and export staples as front page news.

LIBOR

fluctuations are followed by sane r...oc m::metary authorities for another

reason: a

good

share of their international reserves

are deposited in

international banks paying interest around LIOOR. For those countries the
cost of holding reserves is thus approximately given by spreads.

Given the

secrecy surrounding reserve management, 1t is not known how man,y countries
follow such relatively bold policy.

Ten banks are said to have arranged half of all publicized
Eurocredits in 1976 and 1977, providing about one~uarter of the money
themselves; 20 banks arranged two-thirds of the total while providing
one-third of the money. 191 S1m1lar estimates for all international
bank lending are not available.

During

1978 and 1979 contradictory

trends influenced the ccxnpetitiveness of international banking.

The

freeze of Iranian assets deposited in U.S.-owned banks (regardless of
banks' location) decreed by the U.S. government, and the resulting
legal canplications frightened smaller banks away from international
lending.

Rivalry among banks of different nationalities increased,

however.

There was a sharp rise 1n the market share of banks not owned

by U.S. residents,as may be seen 1n Table 10.

For the five Latin

American countries shown in Table 10, U.S. banks provided only 11 percent
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Sane Outstanding International Claims of Banks Reoorting to the BIS
(Billion Current U.S. dollars)

June 1979

December 1977
Countries

Total

Non-U.S.
Banks

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
-subtotal

4.8
23.8
1.6
1.7
19.9
51.8

-All oil
exporters
and non-oil
LDCs
137.9
-World total
excluding
claims on the
650.0
U.S.

U.S.

Total

Banks

Non U.S.
Banks

U.S.
Banks

22.6

2.9
12.1
1.0
1.3
11.9
29.2

9.4
33.9
3.3
2.6
26.0
75.2

15.0
43.4

13.9
1.8
1.6
11.0
31.8

71.1

66.8

194.3

122.1

72.2

424.0

226.0

876.0

624.0

25a.o

L9
11.7
0.7
0.4

B.o

5.8
20.0
1.5
1.1

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Federal Reserve
Bulletin, Table 3.20, issues beginning June 1979; and BIS, reports on
international banking.

3.'5

-37of the net increase :tr: le;1d:inz ·between Decerber 1977 and Ju.-ie 1979.
For all LDCs, including oil-exporters, the corresponding sra:re is
sanewhat srraller (near 10 percent).

Japanese and Italian banks are

reported to have experienced an acceleration in their international
lending; French, Dutch, Swiss, Canadian, British and German banks a.."'€
also expanding their lending to LDCs.

OPEC has been exploring the

financial linkages generated by its staple; banks owned by major oil..

producing nations appear to be expanding fast.

Following its demands

for more of a share 1n refining oil, OPEC strives now to do roore of
the "refining" of its petrodollars. 201 Even banks owned by non-oil LDC
residents appear to have increased their 1nternational activities.
On the whole, 1nternat1onal banking has remained fairly com-

petititive. The number of actors on both sides of the market is not.
very large, so there is a considerable presence of "customer relation
ships" between banks and countries.

But actual and potential new

entrants hovering at the fringes of this market have at least provoked
ccmplaints from international bankers that canpetition is excessive.
E. Other Lenders
Important shares of the debt of non-oil Western Hemisphere
LDCs are still held by foreign governments and international lending
agencies, as well as by private creditors other than financial institutions.
The fonner debt averages nnre favorable servicing conditions, i.e.,
longer maturities and lower and fixed interest rates.

Other private

creditors include bondholders and others who lent at fixed 1nterest
rates.
It was seen earlier that even floating 1nterest rates did
not on average keep up with inflation during the 1970s.

Beyond this,

debt negotiated at fixed interest rates before international 1nflationary

-38e)'.Tlectatior.s becar:ie widespread (say before 197~) gene~ated c~"Jit2.l gair.:::.
for borrowers.

About 45 percent of non-oil Western Hemisphere debt was

to o~ficial creditors at the end of 1973.

Countries like Colanbia obtained

sig;nifica.~t benefits from a debt structure heavy with fixed-interest
obligations.

On

the other hand, a sha.~ of such debt was negotiated. in

currencies other than U.S. dollars; effective interest rates will be
influenced by fluctuations in, say, dollar/Deutsche Mark exchange rates.
Assuming both purchasing power and interest rate parities to hold between
the U.S. and Germany over the long run will not lessen short-and~um
tenn uncertainties regardinp; debt service magnitudes.
Average interest and amortization charges for a given country
will then depend on the exact mix of debt which is old and new, public
and private.

Average debt maturity could ~horten even as Eurocurrency

loans to a country extend theirs.

A rough idea of average interest

and maturity conditions for the whole debt of non-oil Western Hemisphere
countries and Brazil may be obtained comparing interest and amortization
payments to the stock of outstanding debt.

This is done in Table 11.

For Latin America as a group, the average interest charges of Table 11
are of course more favorable than those shown in Table 9.
We have shown that during 1973-80 as a whole average interest
rates on the Latin American debt were no higher than plausible estimates
for annual increases in <;Iollar prices for the region's exports and
imports.

This indicates that inflation-proof accounting would include at

least all registered interest payments in the capital account of the
balance of payments as amortizations.

Excluding all interest payments

from the current accolll'lt would yield the followinp; estimates of the
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Average Condit ions of Offici al a.~d Offici ally Guara~teed Debt

Intere st (percen tages)

Year

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Non-oi l
Western
Hemis2here

6.6
6.7
6.2
6.1
7.1
7.6

Brazil

Amortization Payments
as Percen tages of Debt

Non-oil Western Hemis2here

10.4
12.0
9.9
9.0
10.1
13.3

Sources and Defini tions: Average intere st is the ratio
payments in a given year to debt outstan ding at the end
year, express ed as a percen tage. A simila r calcula tion
amorti zation payments. Non-oil Western Hemisphere data
World Bank debt reporti ng system and the IMF; Brazil ian
Paulo Nogueira Baptis ta Jr., op cit.; p.91

12.1
9.9 10.9
13.2
15.2
13.6

of all intere st
of the previou s
is made for
obtaine d from the
data from

deficit of non-oil Latin America as percentages of goods a11d se~ices
(figures in parentheses reproduce the corresponding estimates of Table 2):

1973:

10 (17 percent)

1974:
1975:
1976:
1977:
1978:
1979:

36
40
18
6

(44
(52
(30
(18

percent)
percent)
percent)
percent)
7 (20 percent)
16 (27 percent)

The nature and conditions of loans from multilateral official
.·

sources have also evolved during the 1970s, although more slowly than those
from private sources.

The

world and regional banks have devised new forms

of associating their loans to private capital, whether from.banks or
private direct investors.

In politically-sensitive areas, such as energy

mineral projects, this association is likely to grow in the future.
'!be World Ban1c can be expected to rove toward program lending, perhaps
and

in canbination w1 th the IMF. 'lbese trends respond to pressiFes on the
international financial system generated not only by OPEC but also by
changes 1n

barga.1n1ng

power between LDCs and foreign investors. We

now turn to exarn1.nation of sane of these systemic issues.

V. Systemic Issues for the 1980s
'!he expansion of international capital markets, the adoption

of floating exchange rates and the macroeconcmic difficulties of many
.industrialized cotmtries have encouraged the reexamination of academic
and

practical orthodoxies, as well as sane Southern heterodoxies. Already

during the late 1950s Northern academic centers witnessed a rebirth of
interest 1n monetary and financial topics.

Northern macroeconomic and

monetary theories underwent sharp debates during the 1960s, leading
to a surge of neaoonetarist and neoclassical positions in the 1970s.
It would be difficult to talk about a ronolithic Northern academic or
even practical orthodoxy on such issues as the desirability of flexible

excha.rise rates, optirrum controls over capital roovements, the correct
strategy to cOOJbat inflation , the necessity of regulatio n over the Euro
currency market, or indeed over national banking systems.

In these matters

there is a "great disorder under heaven". Under these circumstances one
may hear Raul Prebisch castigate the evils of internatio nal inflation

with greater vigor than James 'Ibbin, and find that Robert Mundell defends
fixed exchange rates with greater ardor than Antonio Delfim Netto. Many
Northern econanist s discuss both inflation and balance of payments deficits
using structura l approaches s1m11ar to those emanating fran La.tin America
during the 1950s.

SUpply-side economics are invoked in favoring more

conservat ive policies within the North, and in favoring -easier IMF lending
condition s for LDC borrowers. At a roore practical level it is not unusual
to find Southern exporters together with Northern bankers, "WOrried about
debt service,

s1ng1.ng

the praises of freer world trade, while Northern

trade unionists , together with their "progress ive" academic advisers,
rediscove r all sorts of heterodox arguments for protectio n.
This section, after restating the major advantages which inter

national financial markets of the 1970s offered sane periphera l cotmtries ,
will evaluate criticism s and naws 1n those markets. 'lbose critical
evaluatio ns can be subdivided according to whether they are made indepen
dently of the second OPE.c shock of 1979-80, or whether they

now

fran

that price increase and accanpany1ng circumsta nces. 'Ihe section will
then sketch sane scenarios and proposals to refonn financial markets in
the 1980s, and will discuss the dilenmas they present for major Ire
borrowers .
'1he atrocurre ncy market and internati onal bank lerrling during

the 1970s displayed a m1nber of features which canpare favorably with
earlier capital market arrangements rran the viewpoint of at least sane

-421mportant semi1ndustrial1zed countries, as well as several social.1st cou.~tries.

Probably no :international capital market in history has had a lower degree

of political interference to the dismay of "strategic mirrls" like Dr. Henry
Kissinger.
ex

~

As already noted, competition am::>ng banks has been keen and

interest rates and charges do not seem tmreasonable.

t~ one should note that private bankers have

had

At the same

their enterprise and

risk-taking rewarded; their businesses have expanded and so far no one
has

gone bankrupt lending to LOCs.

In contra.st with pre-1929 Brazilian

experience 1n the New York market, members of the "Bogota group", which
canb1nes major coffee producers, have borrowed freely to finance their
price stabilization operations. Officials in several semi-in:lustrialized
countries have been able to ignore IMF advice with:>ut seeing their external
credit lines dry up. Several oil-bp:>rting Ires were able to avoid
abrupt and defiationa.ry adjustment to post-1973 circumstances, a type
of adjustment of doubtful desirability either frail their national or
an international viewpoint; without the credit resources made available
by international financial markets this policy option would have been
less feasible.

The 1\mds lent by inten1a.tional banks, in contrast w1 th

those available tll"Xier either concessional finance or suppliers' cred1t5,
are untied to either goods or countries. The more transparent 11no
mipackaged nature of bank loans may have reduced frictions and recr1minations
between debtor and creditor countries.
Even before the 1979-80 oil price increases, several criticisms
were levied at private international capital markets. '!he poorest LDCs
were not regarded as creditworthy, so they received very little of the
funds made available by international banking.

It has also been argued

that private financial markets have a ntlJlber of important gaps, limiting
their usefulness even to sem1-1ndustrialized countries. 211 It is true

that one cannot expect private banJr...s to depart far fran behavior dictated
by profit maximization under limited ri.sk-taking and short t1me horizons

so, particularly un:ier conditions of persistent and erratic inflation in
the central currency in international payments, the maturity transformation
the banks can be expected to perfonn will be limited.

Under these circum

stances, long-tenn investments have been financed with short- or mediun
tenn credits, which are rolled over, a far fran ideal arrangement.
AB Fllrocurrency banks can create credit by the beep of a cauputer,
and as they are not subject to official reserve requirements, fears of

explosive credit multipliers originating in those banks were orten
expressed during the 1970s. Closer analysis has shown that leaks t'ran
&lrocurrency markets to national credit systems sharply limit their aggregate
credit-creating potential, especially when major Central Banks abstain
fran depositing their reserves with Eurocurrency banks, as has been the

case for several years.

'!he Eurocurrency market can be said to have

increased the efficiency of worldwide financial intennediation, so that
by making possible a m:>re efficient use of a given world JOOnetary base

it does add to inteIT1B.tional liquidity.

But it is now generally con-

cluded that estimates of world mney supply with or without a Eurocurrency
market would differ only by a few percentage points; therefore, proposals
for macroeconanic controls over bank lending such as a universal reserve
requirement have been recently downplayed. 221
Financial panics during the 1930s led

many

industrialized

countries, notably the United states, to insure depositors against the
consequences of bank failures.

'Ihis policy a.1med at avoiding the chain

effects of nms on banks, and consequent credit collapses.

National

central banks, as ultimate insurers of deposits and as lenders of last

-44resort, 1n turn dema."lded to inspect and regulate the lending activitie s
of private banks. This

IM.de good

sense,

as

private

banks would

otherwise have

tended to undertake &xcessive risks,res ting on the security provided by
the new policies. 'fue a1m was to make the financial system less prone to
massive failures while maintaini ng disciplin e and lending standards , or
what 1n the literatur e is known as limiting the problem of ''mral hazard"
intrinsic in
national

any

banks

insurance scheme. Sane observers have argued that inter

have tended to be careless in making loans to IDCs,

encouraged by explicit or inplicit insurance or Northern govemnents for
their depositor s

and

for their politicall y-1nport ant borrowers; this calls in

their view for greater regulatio n of the lending practices of those banks.
Note that this alleged market failure offsets (whether partly or ioore than
fully is JOOOt) lending restrictio ns generated by the adverse selection
and country risk problems.

It is debatable whether the U.S. government

is less likely to appear insuring the

bank

debts of Chrysler Corporation

than or 'furkey or South Korea, but these critics note that the supervisi on

over Eurocurrency lending has

been

less than that exercised over danestic

lending. Other glocrnier critics argue that while banks' overconfident
perceptio ns have indeed led to overlendi ng, the intema.ti onal camnm.1.ty
does not in fact have very clear
as lender of last resort

and

explicit rules about who should act

at times of acute financial stress,

and such a

situation could lead to a major financial crash.
Discussions of 1nperfect ions 1n internati onal financial markets,
flaws which in sane cases favored LDC borrowers, had becane attenuate d
shortly before the 1979-80 oil price increases . Although the new current
account deficits foreseen for non-oil LJXs are lower relative to their
GNPs or exports than those of 1974-75, they cane on top of significa nt
debt accl.ll1Ulat1oo and at a time of less favorable growth prospects

danesticall y and abroad, so there has been renewed anxieties.ab out

financial markets.

'!he outlook ror the early 1980s depends on a few

crucial variablesJ which can be discussed with the help of a

now rood.el

sketched in Figure 2J focus:1/lg on the interaction s of GNP (or GNP growth)J
current account positionsJ and the preferences

or

internation al financial

1ntennediar ies.
Asstme the world 1s divided into three regions:
and non-OP.EC LDCs.

OP.EC, OECD.t

Asst1ne further that OP.EC GNP (or its growth) 1s

exogenously given by the developnent plans of those countries, and that
the real oil price 1s also given.

'lhe OPF.C current account surplus (OA)

will then depend on non-OPEC GNP (or its growth, fran now on denoted
as Y), arxi its canpositia, between LDC Y and OF.cD Y.
'lhe negatively sloping l1ne YY' gives the OP.EC surplus
correspondi ng to a given non-OPEC Y; if oil requirement s per unit of
Y were equal 1n I.DCs and OECD the line would be vertical.

non-OP.EC Y there will be a different line YY..

For each

'1he vertical axis

gives I.re Y relative to OECD Y; as this ratio increases (maintainin g
constant their weighted sum to yield a given non-OPEC Y) it is assumed
that the OPEC surplus will decline, i.e., that there is a greater use
of oil per unit of Y in OECD than 1n LDCs.
'!he positively sloping lines 1n the diagram show the LDC

current account deficit.

'lbe difference between those two lines represents

the LDC deficit with OPEC.
depend solely on the ratio

'Ihe LDC deficit with OECD is assumed to

or LDC

Y to OF.CD Y.

'!he IDC deficit with OPEC

will increase as LDC Y increases, so the total LDC deficit will ·surely increase
as LDC Y increases with a given non-OP.EC Y.

'!he diagram supposes that

LOC y
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during the time span relevant for our analysis adjustment mechanisms
other than chariges 1n Y can do little to affect the structure of world
current accotmt deficits and surpluses.
Consider first a borderline situation when the OPEC surplus OA
is exactly matched by an UlC overall deficit of equal arrount, ma.de up of
an UlC deficit with OECD of OB and an LDC deficit with OPEC of BA..
then has a defic_~t with OPEC of OB.

OE'::D

Supposing that all capital nx>vements

are handled by internation al financial intennediar ies (1.e. , assume away
grants, direct investnents etc.), those institution s will witness an
increase in their net claims on non-OPEC LOCs equal to OA, matched by
increased OPEC claims on the intennediar ies.
Consider now a situation when after several years of accllllUlating
claims on LOCs, the f.inancial intennediar ies decide that it would be
"1TJ¥)rudent" to maintain the same rate of accumulation. A possible outcane,
for a given non-OPEC Y, would be a reduction in Ire Y and an increase
in OECD Y, fran OZ to OW.

In the new situation financial intermediar ies

would reduce their accumulation of LDC debts to OE, while accumulating
nx>re reliable O:ECD paper at a rate of ED. The OECD will becane a
capital inporter.

A more likely possibility avoiding an increase in

the OPEC surplus would involve both a reduction of non-OPEC Y (leading
to a shift of YY to the left) and a reduction of UX:: Y relative to OECD

Y.
For a given non-OPEC Y, an increase in the real price of oil
would be depicted in Figure 2 by a shift to the right of YY.' •

An

opposite shift would result fran an increase in the development plans of
OPEC.

Neither an increase in oil prices nor in OPEC Y would shift the

line showing the I.DC deficit with OECD, but would of course shift (to
the right for oil price increases, to the left for OPEC Y increase) the

~B
line showing the overall I.IX: deficit, reflecting changes in the bala'1ce

of paym:mts between LOCs and OPEC.

The

shifts in the line depicting

the overall LOC deficit would be horizontally smaller than the YY' shirts.
More vigorous conservation policies would shift YY' to the
left; its slope will change ·if those efforts are proportionally different
1n UX::s and OECD.

IOC conservation efforts would also be reflected in

a leftward shift in the line indicating its total current account deficit.
'!he discussion centered on Figure 2 has said nothing so far

about the price at which finance is extended.

International credit

conditions will be detennined by the market sketched in Figure 1, where
stocks of financial assets and liabilities, not Just annual flows, are
taken

into account.

One of the major uncertainties for LOC borrowers

looking at the 1980s is whether the low or even negative real rates of
interest prevailing during the 1970s will continue. Long-tenn theories
of interest rates would indicate that the 1970s situation was ancmalous,
the result of unexpected inflation. 'lhl.s view is strengthened by
noting that OPF.c countries will prefer to leave appreciating oil under
ground tmless they can obtain similar rates of return on their financial

investments.

OPF.c calculations plus a desire to control inflation,

to check balance of payments deficits, and to maintain the position
of the dollar as the daninant international currency would induce the
United States to follow tighter credit policies 1n the 1980s. Given a
high

degree of international capital mobility, all major ir.dustrialized

countries would follow sim1lar policies; indeed, some 'or them already
did during the 1970s.

Up

until recently most I.DC borrowing was denanina.ted

in dollars; had it been denan1nated 1n Oennan marks !!. ~ real interest
rates would have been higher.

The

argwnent is that during the 1980s

I.re borrowing conditions will tighten partly because more of the borrowing

will be denan1nated in marks and other hard currencies, am partly because

-49u. S. nnnetary policy will be ioore to the liking of Arabs and Germans.
Finally, Chinese borrowing during the 1980s could add substantial demand

pressure on financial markets.
Perhaps.

tax, have

nenaged

Negative real rates of interest, especially after
to last in· ma.'1Y countries for long periods. Macro

econom:tc disturbances may call for negative interest rates as part of the
adjustment mechanism, contrary to long run considerations; such ma.cro
econanic short-rans, put back to back, can stretch out for many years.
8cm:! of those mak1ng OPEC productiai decisions may be ma.ximizing family

wealth placed 1n !Dndon or Zurich rather than their countries' social
wealth.

Political considerations will place lower as well·as upper

oil production; consider the faroous scenario 1n which low
returns cm financial surpluses induces OPF.c to cut oil output, leading

bounds on

to price increases Which, g1ven inelastic demand, raise investible

t'"inancial surpluses, mtivating further production cutbacks and so on.
It is unlikely that suchtf'c.etonnement could proceed very far with:>ut

political repercussions.
<xi balance there is

a presl..lllption that real interest rates

during the 1980s will be higher than during the 1970s, but as with other
variables, the uncertainty regarding such forecast is high.
Higher spreads over prime rates for LDC borrowers are also
foreseen by sane.
already

The

argument is that maJ or international

banks

have

allocated what they, or their regulators, regard as a high share

of their portfolio to LOC debt, so

any

further increase (if forthcom1ng

at all) has to be canpensated by higher rewards for risk-taking.
1979-80 the financial press

and

IAlring

sane authorities have called attention

to deteriorating capital-asset ratios of banks engaged in international
lending. Typically, it is concluded that higher spreads
margins are needed to expand banking capital.

and

profit
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The consi derat ions appea r to assume that entry of new
banks

into inter natio nal lendin g is slo...-,

and

that banki ng capit al cannot grow

by other means than the reinv estme nt of profi t.

These asst1Dptions are

debat able.

It can also be noted the the microeconanic ratio nale for
rigid rules- of-thu mb about capit al-as set ratio s, or ceilin gs on
portf olio
share s, are obscure at best.
very diffe rent ceilin gs

and

In pract ice U.S. and non-U.S. banks have

ratio s; even with the U.S. there exist subst antia l

diffe rence s in the capit al-as set ratio s of iooney cente r banks and
other banks . • In the rapid ly changing intern ation al banki ng indus

try.

those actor s follow ing, or being force d to follow , rigid rulesof-thu mb
are IOOl"e likel y.to lose marke t-shar es than to influe nce sprea ds
decis ively .
·Yet in the short -run consi derab le inconvenience may be inflic ted
on sate
borrowers by the existe nce of such rules . '!he Manag ing Direc tor
of the IMF',
in an addre ss durin g October 1980,

warne d

that prude ntial regul ation s or

balan ce of payments measures in indus triali zed count ries shoul
d avoid
disru pting intern ation al finan cial inter redia tion. He also obser
ved that
there has been no serio us decli ne in average capit al ratio s for
banks in

major finan cial cente rs in recen t years ; that the share in banks
' gross
exter nal asset s repre sente d by loans to non-o il I.res did not
rise signi 
fican tly durin g the last decade (rerna1.n1ng around 17 perce nt) ;
that the
loan- loss exper ience 1n lendin g to LDCs
than that on danes tic lendi ng;

has been

as

good

as or bette r

that the safeguards to the under lying
23/
stabi lity or the finan cial system seem today stron ger than a decad
e ago. The 1980 war between Iraq and Iran has highl ighte d
the wl
and

nerab ility of econoodc forec asts to the delic ate polit ical situa
tion
1n the Middle Fast. A number of JrO'POSals have been accllT
lllated 1n
recen t years to incre ase the robus tness
1

or the

intern ation al finan cial

system to such shocks. The varie ty 1n motiv ations

and

speci fics is

-51l~ge ; here it will be enoug.11 to focus on sane proposals which give

special cause for concern to major LOC borrowers.
Cne

woITisane scenario is suggested by the fact that in

contrast with, say, internat_ional non-oil camxxtlty markets, nowadays
market imperfections in the international loan market are discussed
and

perceived m::>re clearly in the North than arrong the major Southern

borrowing countries.

At first sight it is remarkable how sane private

bankers, arguing that "the market 1s out of (their) control", plead

for more official lending to LDCs, i.e., seek actions which can take
business away fran them, and argue 1n favor of greater bureaucratic
supervision such as a larger IMF role 1n the lend1ng process. Often the
same bankers will argue that Central Banks should stay out

or the

foreign

exchange markets •. One may contrast this puzzle with that generated by
OPEC exhorting its cust~rs to conserve oil. What they appear to seek
is a 11 rationalization " or lending under IMF planning to reduce "cutthroat"
canpetition.

Note that this has already been achieved for state-sub

sidized and insured export credits, with OECD countries agreeing to
guidelines on interest floors, maxinun credit periods and m1n1murn cash
payments.

'Ihese controlled credits, tied to the sale of each OECD country's

products are expected by sane observers to grow during the 1980s at a
faster rate than untied private bank loans.

Northern practical and

academic orthodoxies has suddenly tmearthed all sorts of extema.l.1t1es,
distortions and market 1n1>erfections to justify increased regulation of
private financial .flows to non-oil LDCs.

OPF.C members w1 th the largest

financial surpluses could be induced to fonn a ~1t1on to regulate world
capital markets, perhaps under the IMF and World Banlc umbrellas. OPE.c participants

-52would obtain "sound and remunerative financial assets" while Northern
private banks would enjoy "orderly market conditions" 1n which higher
interest costs and spreads could
to go.

be

passed on to borrowers with nowhere

Industrial countries would obtain steadier oil nows as OPEC

trades oil underground for the safe financial asset.

The

Fourth World

could be induced, with m:xiest side payments, to give an appearance of
legitimacy to such a reestablisnnent of centralized Northern control
over international financial flows.

Note that part of the iootivation

for the proposed SUbstitution Account at the IMF was to meet OPEC's
dissatisfaction with available financial assets. 241 'lhis scenario
would be the counterpart of the coalition between OPEC and the traditional
oil nru.l.tinationals, which operates with great tensions and frictions
but has been enonoously profitable for both sides so far.
Unless a major international political crisis threatens to
induce an old-fashioned financial panic, a thoroughgoing cartelization
of capital markets is unlikely to be realized.

As with transnational

corporations, banks of different nationalities maintain rivalries which
are not easily reconciled. Episodes such as those 1n 1974 involving
the Herstatt Bank of Cologne and the Franklin National Bank of New York
established the precedent that the Central Bank of each country would
take care of the problems of banks owned by its citizens, no matter
where those banks are located. 'Il'lis approach does not provide a fail-proof
lender of last resort at the international level, but ellm1na.tes the
roost salient brittleness of intemational banking.

Naturally, this

camutment by Central Banks has been accanpanied by a closer supervision of the portfolios of private banks, and the insistence that
banks provide consolidated balance sheets covering all or their worldwide
operations.

-53Du...'"ing

the late 1970s the IMP was on the whole an ineffective

bystander 1n the process of recycling oil surplus to major LDC borrowers.
Years of obtuse and do~tic IMF staff work, especially in its Western
Han1.sphere department, induced key LOCs to stay away.

Cnly countries

without options sought resources fran the Ftmd; such adverse selection
reinforced that institution's wicked-witch image.

0ne·1nportant side

effect of the 1970s expansion of international financial markets was to
put pressure on the bureaucracies of the lMF (and to a lesser extent
on those of the IBRD and regional banks) to rethink rigid policies,

under pa.in of losing their legitimacy by having no dealings .with sane of
the most important LDCs.

It is m:x,t whether Brazil needs the IMF more

than the IMF needs Brazil.
An

IMF with more nexible lending conditions seems to be

emerging during

1980; it will

be also necessary for it to obtain greater

resources before it becanes an attractive major lerrler to large LDCs
with several borrowing options.
quickly fran the new IMF.
planning

new

'1be Fourth World, however, could benefit

'!be IBRD and regional banks are also

rechanisms, especially connected with investments 1n energy

and natural resources, to expand the resource nows to I.Des.

Pleas

for more concessional finance to the Fourth World continue to be heard.
So
opened

long as toose trends do not significantly limit the options_

to LDC borrowers by private international f1nancial markets,

1.e. , threaten to ioove 1n the direction of an international credit cartel,
major LOC borrowers could benefit fran them. The major benefit would

-54probably be 1n the insurance they could proVide against major financial
panics, and the influence such insurance would exert on the supply price
of credit.

Uncertainties surrounding the process of rolling over the

debt to private banks, one c,f the major sources of preoe~upation for
LOC borrowers, could be alleviated.
Exactly how institutions such as the IMF' and the IBRD ~inge
on capital markets will remain of maJ or importance for LDC borrowers.
Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela are
not "small co1m:tries" in those markets and could have, especially if
they acted together, a significant influence in framing new policies for
the IMF and IBRD, as well as in the process of setting rules of the game
ror the 1980s financial nows.
As an exaI!l)le of a specific proposal for greater IMF or IBRD

participation in financial intennediation which is unlikely to benefit
major Ire borrowers one may mention the idea of having those institutions
issue long-tenn bonds indexed to international inflation.

Such a

proposal would place a floor under real interest rates, to the delight of
lenders.

In exchange for such a concession, ultimate LDC borrowers

using IMF or IBRD as intermediaries would prestmiably obtain larger infiows
without roll-over headaches, as debt maturities would roore closely match
real investment gestation periods.

There is considerable room in inter

national financial markets, especially 1n bond markets, for innovation
and experimentation , but such initiatives, especially if they involve
indexing, are best left to individua.l borrowers. Giving creditors an
assurance of positive real rates of interest, backed by the international
camunity represented by the IMF or IBRD, under the macroeconanic circ~

stances of the early 1980s appears to be an idea in the interest of
neither LDC borrowers nor of 100st other countries.

-55The tone of this section has been based on an economic and
financial outlook which is of rooderate optimism relative to catastrophic
scenarios, or of m:xierate pessimism relative to the 1970s perfonnance.
Major LDC borrowers will face·less favorable borrowing conditions, and
the net capital inflows they will obtain will be less relative to their

GNPs.

other LDCs whose indebtedness grew less in the 1970s, however,

could expand the-ir borrowing faster in the future.

GNP growth rates

of major LDC borrowers could decline sanewhat even relative to those
of 1973-80, 'While pressure will continue to expand exports am restrain
1.nports. Regardless of financial considerations, the adjustment to higher
real energy prices will involve significant costs.

Could matters become

worse for major WC borrowers? What. if OECD CO\mtries allow steep
declines 1n their GNPs, turn to 1930s-style protectionism, or refuse
to allow their banks even to roll-over I.DC debts?

In the spirit or the

"scarce currency clause" of the IMF Articles of Agreement, under those
circumstances LOCs would have little choice but to suspend, subject
to negotiations, the servicing of their debt and to follow JOOre inward.
oriented policies, perhaps revitalizing third world integration schemes.
Gains from international specialization would decline, but even then
many

LDCs could maintain reasonable growth rates.

'Ihe largest semi

industrialized countries would be in a better position to handle such
a shock than the smaller IDCs, although the specific energy situation
of each country will also heavily influence their perfonnance. Even
under these circ\.UllStances JOOst LDC debtors will want to maintain substantial
ccmnercial, financial, and technological links with Northern econan:i.es,
enough to discourage them fran repudiating their debt.
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Previous sections suggest that on balance semi-industrial ized
co1.L11tries were helped

by

the emergence

national financial markets·~
were higher

and

and

expansion of private inter

True enough, the costs of private credits

of a shorter-tenn nature than official bilateral or

multilateral finance.

However, volumes were higher, procedures were

rore expedite and looser strings were attached, both at the political
and at the economic policy levels. But the opportunities created by the
new international capital markets need not generate welfare gains in
borrowing countries;

funds may_be raised cheaply but spent so foolishly

as to create repayment problems, and the availability of external finance
can lead to lower danestic savings.

Other questions of a socio-econanic

nature, which we will review briefly in this section, have been raised
concerning the 1970s external financial links of Latin America.
Financial intermediation rose to preeminence in sane Latin American
countries along with blossoming international capital markets.

A practical

orthodoxy developed preaching that "the more financial intermediation the
better".

Gurley

and Shaw

popularized correlation measures between

the degree of financial DK>dernization and indexes of econanic development.
Ronald McKinnon argued vigorously against "financial repression".

Som:!

graduates from the University of Chicago rose in the 1970s to policy
making

positions in Southern Cone govenvnents and started fnl:>lementing

policies of financial liberalizatioo.

Brazil and Mexico followed roore

pragmatic policy courses, but 1n both countries foreign finance strongly
influenced the rhyttm of econanic activity and the nature of govemment
policy

mak1ng during

the 1970s.

-57Evidence on LDC ex-post sa\rl....ngs and real capital fonnation is
sketchy for the oost recent years; for 1974-77 data indicate a maintenance
or an increase in the share of gross domestic investment in GDP relative
to 1972-73 for rost major groups of LOCs.

Available savings rates for

major Latin American cotmtries are presented in Table 12.

Only

three

countries show a decline in savings rates relative to the late 1960s;
paradoxically, _two of those countries ( Chile and Uruguay) have under
gone financial liberalization.

Bearing in mind the likely underestima.tion

of danestic savings due to a lack of inflation-proof Balance of Payments
accounting, the perfonnance of Brazil appears reasonable, and those
for Argentina, Colanbia, Mexico and Venezuela also seem at least
adequate for the period covered.
Deregulation of financial markets in Southern Cone countries led
to old-style banking losing canpetitive power to adventurescme but
capital-short "financieras".

Under these conditions, lack of goverrment

insurance of depositors frequently resulted in panics and scandals,
the regulatory sequel of which tended to strengthen the oligopolistic
character of the local banking sector.
'lbese trends were accanpanied by a substantial increase 1n the
share of financial intermediation 1n the national econanies.

A tendency

towards the centralization of capital in the hands of econanic groups
with a banking basis seems to have occurred.· "Old" industrialists lost
economic power to "new" financiers.

Sane

Latin American economists feared

that the banking sector would go through a process of denationalization,
as Dilltinational banks benefitted fran deregulation to enter a market
where previously only dcrnestic residents were allowed.

1-k>wever, danestic

economic groups proved to be more active than anticipated by these economists;
financial liberalization apparently proceeded along with new fonns of
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Gross Nation al Savings 1n Selecte d Latin American Cotmtries
(Percentages of gross nation al produc t)

1960-64
Argent ina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Urugua.y

Venezuela

19.0
21.1
13.1
17.0
17.3
22.8
12.6
32.1

1965-69
19.2
21.8
15.0
17.3
19.4
16.8
13.8
29.4

1970-74

1975-78

20.5
23.8
11.8
17.7
19.1
14.3
10.2
35.1

21.la/
22.3
6.7
21.4
21.#
10.1
10.6
34.8

a/ Refers to 1975 through 1977 only.
Source s: Adapted fran Table III-2, p.63, 1n Inter-American Development
Banlc, Economic and Social Progre ss 1n Latin America; 1979 Report ,
Washington, D.C. Basic data are at curren t prices 1n nation al curren cies.

.-59associati on betwee~ danestic and foreign capital rather tha~ with a
massive takeover of the former by the latter.
Other econcrnists were concerned with the possibili ty that the
substitut ion of "financi~ _capital" for "producti ve capital 11 would
impart a stagnatio nist bias to Southern Cone financial liberaliz ation

policies.

We argue below that sane Keynesian problems have emerged,

but that they are probably of a short to medium term nature, not of a
long-run stagriatio nist variety.

Nonethele ss, it is hard to see what

welfare gains can be generated by speculati ve act1Vity of the variety
witnessed in Argentina during 1976-80.

In this context, one should

remember the following point of Kenneth J. Arrow: " ••• in speculati ve
markets such as those for stocks and coom:xilty futures, a large am:>unt
invested in the acquisiti on of new informati on for private advantage will
yield no social gain, only a zero-sum redistrib ution •••We may have very
able people who could be useful spending their t ~ in productio n instead
of trying to outwit others!1251
'Ille progressi ve loss of goverrment control over IIX>netary aggregate s
in a context of openness to internati onal financial markets confused
policy makers and econanic analysts alike.

Old style monetaris ts had to

recycle themselves to get rid of their preoccupa tion with active monetary
policy, reluctant ly accepting the idea of an endogenous nnney supply.
Structur alist economists on the other hand had to wrestle with their old
propositi ons for passive ·money to becane active partisans of steriliza tion
policies in the contest of a financial ly open econoozy.
In the Southern Cone, the "new Chicago" eventuall y prevailed over

the "old Chicago", and policy makers there, while furtherin g the processes
of trade and financial liberaliz ation,sta rted seeking fixed nominal
exchange rates as well as zero budget deficits.

Prae,natism continued
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to characterize Brazilia:1 and Colanbian policy-making.

With va...rying

degrees of success, these countries attempted to stick with a crawling
peg without explicit targets, and to maintain seignorage over the
m:>netary base by restrictiJ:ig access of domestic residents to inter
national financial markets.

Mexico

wanted to follow a similar path,

but 1n her case the task of avoiding currency substitution was made
much m::>re difficult than in Brazil or Colombia, in view of her geo
graphical and economic proximity to the United States.
We conclude that the existence of a fiuid international financial
market, by changing the nature of external economic incentives and
penalties, nudged La.tin American economies into a new roold during the
1970s.

In principle, it extended the

range of options opened to econanic

policy making, hence providing new opportunities for econanic gain.
But it also shaped the system of econanic incentives in particular
directions and induced some shifts of relative econanic power within
countries.

In this context, the rules of access established

by

danestic

policy makers seem to have been a basic detenninant of the short to medium
term consequences of financial opermess.

'lbe returns

are not all 1n

yet, but fran our present perspective countries which followed a more
p~tic and gradualistic course of action regarding domestic financial
liberalization and links with international capital markets (as Brazil and
Colanbia) seem to have done better than countries which pursued a roore
doctrinaire policy course (as in the Southern Cone).
'lbe use of indexed goveITJDant bonds is a characteristic feature

of the financial refonns that have accanpanied the process of financial
opermess 1n the Latin American context.

In the remaWer of this

section, we discuss sane Keynesian conundrums evoked by the experience
of countries following this policy path.

-61According to the financial refonners, increased availability of
financial paper paying positive real interest rates should both increase
the

now

of private saving and divert wealth holding away frc:m non

productive uses (land, housing, consumer durables) into productive assets.
Latin-American experiences with financial reform confinn the pre
diction about the increase in scrne forms of financial saving; however,
private product~ve investment did not expand.

The ex-ante propensity to

save may go up but private investment rates are not larger than before.
'lhis reaction to financial refonn has been accoopanied by persistently
high

inflation rates and lagging exchange rates. Reasons for thes~

Latin-American aberrations are not entirely clear, but sane conjectures
are worth exploring.

We consider successively stylized versions of the portfolio
decisions related to the canposition of danestic currency-denanina.ted
assets, and of the portfolio decisions concerning the distribution of wealth
between danestic and international assets, before and after "financial
liberation".

In a financially repressed econany with a history of persistent
inflation, wealth is held as JOOney, land, and capital.

In relative•te~,

the first two are haoogeneous coomodities whereas the latter is a collection
of heterogeneous goods.

Money is held because of 1ts property as a means

of payment; capital, because of its expected yield in use; and land, as
a shelter against inflation.

Expected land yields may be low but they

are strongly correlated with inflation rates, and thus safer to hold than
heterogeneous capital.

'!be liquidity of land is higher than capital but

much lower than iooney.

The

real yield of the latter is strongly negative.

Lack of a high yielding asset with a strong secondary market presumably
underlies low observed saving propensities. Moreover, a high proportion

of net additions to wealth take the form of unproductive land holdings
for 11 speculative " purposes.
In this context, financial refonn-m:mgers typically propose intro

ducing an 1ndexed government bond as an inst!"l..ment of financial liberation
(in McKinnon's tenninology _th1s boils down to paying real interest rates
on ''m:>ney") • In the presence of such an attractive asset w1th a strong
back-up market, saving propensitie s should increase and a higher proportion
of wealth be held as "productive " capital.

An implicit h,ypothesis seems

to be that the bond will protect wealth-owners against innation better
than land holdings do.

Hence, the required real rate of return on

capital will be lower and thus capital accunulatio n will be favored for
a given state of long-tenn expectation s.
As

already noted, Iatin-Ameri can experience supports the prestunption

regarding some financial savings, but not the expectation on private investment
rates.

The apparent reason is that indexed bonds tend to replace capital

(and money) rather than land in private portfolio holdings.

Free--market

oriented financial refonns are accanpanied by a general liberalizati on of
interest rates, 1n the context of a demand-contra.ctionary package of policies.
Bankruptcie s in the productive sector and panics and scandals 1n the
financial sector are frequent.

As

a consequence, there is a weakening 1n

the state of confidence with which expectation s about future capital
values are held.

The

demand price of capital falls and the rate of

invest!lEnt adjusts downward at a time when saving propensitie s are on
the increase.

High short-tenn interest rates tend to raise the supply

price of output in the short-run. Excess supply of nxmey

may

also obtain,

in spite of contraction ary nnnetary policies, if the demand for rooney
(in the appropriate M:t_ concept) is sufficientl y lowered by the

introductio n of indexed bonds.

Continuing high infiation rates,

higher unemployrrent rates, and lower growth rates of potential output
are the short to medimn-tenn consequences of 111-1.n:plemented financial refonns.

-63Similar problems

may

occur with respect to the portfolio

decisions vis-a-vis dollar- and peso-denaninate d wealth.

Capital

market reformers correctly expect that the creation of danestic
indexed bonds will induce .foreign as well as national wealth-owners

to shift a higher proportion of their wealth out of dollar and into
peso-denaninate d assets.

Experience confinns that foreign financial

inflows are larger than before, as predicted by the theory, but also
that they do not find a real outlet, as dcmestic absorption goes
down following the mechanism sketched in the previous paragraph.
Capital account surpluses are not matched by correspondingly large~.
full-capacity current account deficits.

Official foreign reserves

accumulate and exchange rates lag behind purchasing power parities.
'!be "retraso carnbiario" establishes itself, weakening exports and

strengthening the propensity to inport; paradoxically enough, the
level of activity in the tradable goods sector shrinks in order to absorb
the :increased flow of foreign savings.
Portfolio reshuffling favoring goverrrnent debt is a cooroon charac
teristic of these examples of financial refonn.

If the government uses

the proceeds of higher bond sales either to increase its own investment
or to subsidize private investment, real incane growth

may

be maintained,

at the cost of increased goverrrnent intervention in the econanic sphere
and expanding foreign debt.

If the proceeds of higher bond sales are

used to control the growth rate of money supply, inflation rates

may

subside

but the rate of investment and potential output growth do not recover.
Academic orthodoxy, f'ran Ma,ynard Keynes to James Tobin, has taught
that the propensity to :invest 1s not cotenninous with the propensity to save.

lack of attention to this basic teaching on the part of practical orthodoxy
nay explain the failures of recent attempts at financial reform in
La.tin America.

Much research is needed on the patterns of substitution

and complementarity annng-assets, in the context of high and varying
rates of inflation characteristic of La.tin American countries.
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